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Self-Regulation for the Mortgage Industry
M. Todd Hendersont
INTRODUCTION
Wells Fargo, the country's largest mortgage lender, recently
paid about $175 million to settle claims that it steered more
minority borrowers into riskier mortgage products than it did
white borrowers with similar credit risks.1 According to data
revealed during the Department of Justice's investigation of this
alleged wrongdoing, black borrowers who qualified for a plain-
vanilla loan were nearly three times more likely to take out a
subprime loan than similarly situated white borrowers;
Hispanic borrowers were about twice as likely.2 The Wells Fargo
bankers allegedly targeted vulnerable consumers-"those with
less education, without previous mortgage experience, or
without fluent English"-for riskier and more expensive loan
products.3 Minority borrowers also paid more in broker fees than
white borrowers: in 2007, for instance, black and Hispanic
borrowers in Chicago paid between $2,000 and $3,000 more in
broker's fees (on $300,000 loans) than similar white borrowers. 4
More generally, the use of riskier mortgage products
expanded dramatically during the housing boom of the early
2000s. From 2000 to 2006, the number of borrowers who
qualified for conventional mortgages but nevertheless took out
t Professor of Law and Aaron Director Teaching Scholar, The University of Chicago
Law School. Thank you to the members of The University of Chicago Legal Forum for
their work in putting together an excellent conference, of which this Article is a very
small part.
1 Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, NY Times B3
(July 13, 2012).
2 Id.
Nicholas D. Kristof, A Banker Speaks, With Regret, NY Times A39 (Dec 1, 2011).
4 Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, NY Times at B3 (cited in
note 1) (stating borrowers "paid an average of $2,937 more in broker fees if African-
American, and $2,187 more if Hispanic, compared with white borrowers with a similar
credit risk").
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subprime adjustable-rate mortgages increased by approximately
50 percent.5 Many of these mortgages were interest-only,
requiring no or very little down payments, and requiring no
income verification. Millions of these mortgages became
unsustainable when house values started to fall.6 When the
housing market turned for the worse shortly thereafter,
thousands of borrowers were forced into default. As of late 2011,
nearly 30 percent of mortgagors were "underwater," meaning
they owed more than their homes were worth.' This series of
events led to huge losses for individual borrowers and for the
economy as a whole. Indeed, according to one study, mortgage
fraud caused losses of about $112 billion over the three-year
period from 2005 to 2007.8 The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission put it bluntly: "Lenders made loans that they knew
borrowers could not afford."9
The regulatory response has been twofold. To get at the
most egregious cases of abuse, federal and state prosecutors
have brought many lawsuits alleging fraud by mortgage brokers
and others in the mortgage supply chain.10 These lawsuits are
important, but cannot be the only response to misbehavior in
mortgage markets. Many activities that fell short of fraud
resulted in significant consumer losses, including foreclosures,
loss of paper equity, and dashed dreams. For example, it is not
necessarily fraudulent to sell someone a mortgage for which that
person is ill suited. The line between salesmanship or
persuasion and fraud is blurry, but much undesirable conduct is
" Rick Brooks and Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy,
Wall St J Al (Dec 3, 2007) ("[T]he proportion [of subprime borrowers who would likely
have qualified for conventional mortgages] rose even higher by the end of 2006, to 61%.
The figure was just 41% in 2000.").
6 Liz Moyer, Beware Interest-Only, Forbes (Forbes Dec 7, 2005), online at http://
www.forbes.com/2005/12/06/interest-only-mortgages-cx_1m_1207mortgage.html (visited
Sept 15, 2013) (noting the share of interest-only mortgages rose to 23 percent of all loans
in the last six months of 2004).
Kristof, A Banker Speaks, With Regret, NY Times at A39 (cited in note 3).
8 See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and
Economic Crisis In the United States xxii (Feb 25, 2011), online at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
9 See id.
10 See, for example, United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland,
Mortgage Fraud (DOJ Jan 29, 2013), online at http://www.justice.gov/usaolmd/
priorities financialfraud.html (visited Sept 15, 2013) (compiling examples of federal
mortgage fraud prosecutions in Maryland).
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not illegal. If disclosures are made, if the terms are customary,
and if the deal is neither unconscionable nor discriminatory,
then courts will likely not punish the seller. Fraud requires
intent to deceive, which is difficult to prove under these
circumstances." Yet many of these nonfraudulent practices led
to significant-and potentially avoidable-consumer losses.
To get at the nonfraudulent but undesirable set of cases,
Congress passed two significant pieces of legislation. The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 2 (the
"Dodd-Frank Act") created a new administrative agency, the
Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), to regulate
mortgage lenders and mortgage transactions, among other
things. 13 As discussed below, the Dodd-Frank Act also
established fiduciary duties for mortgage lenders, regulated
rates, set minimum standards for loans, prohibited certain types
of loans and fees, and created a new bureaucracy to educate
consumers. 14 The newly created CFPB, along with various
federal and state bank regulators, administers these changes
and programs. To give one instance, in 2012, the CFPB issued
the Qualified Residential Mortgage rule (QRM), which provided
a legal safe harbor for lenders who issue loans meeting the QRM
standard, including a debt limit of 43 percent of borrower
income, a cap on mortgage points and fees of 3 percent, and
other rules. 15
The other significant statutory reform was the Secure and
Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 200816 (the
"SAFE Act"), which created a new federal licensing scheme for
mortgage brokers.' 7 Prior to the SAFE Act, mortgage brokers
were licensed by state regulatory authorities, if at all. About
one-third of the states, including large states like California, did
" See, for example, Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 191 & n 7 (1976).
12 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010), codified in various sections of the United
States Code.
13 Dodd-Frank Title X, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 1955-2113, codified in
various sections of Title 12.
14 See Part I.C.
15 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Proposed Amendments to the
Ability to Repay Standards under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed Reg
6622, 6623 (amending 12 CFR § 1026).
'e Pub L No 110-289, 122 Stat 2810, codified at 12 USC § 5101 et seq.
17 SAFE Act § 1502, Pub L No 110-289, 122 Stat at 2810.
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not even require mortgage brokers to be licensed.18 This
prompted Senator Dianne Feinstein, a co-sponsor of the SAFE
Act, to draw an analogy to securities brokers:
When someone buys 100 shares of stock, they must go
through a licensed securities broker. . . . Until recently,
some purchased their home-a far more valuable asset-
through an independent mortgage broker or lender who
may have had a criminal background or no license at all.
This lack of accountability enabled unscrupulous brokers
to commit fraud at the expense of unsuspecting
homebuyers.19
Under rules implementing the SAFE Act that were
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, and
several other federal agencies, mortgage brokers must obtain a
unique federal number, undergo a background check, and be
fingerprinted.20 In addition, states are required to have licensure
regimes, and nonbank brokers must obtain a state license.21
Senator Feinstein's analogy between securities and
mortgage brokers raises an interesting issue, which is the
subject of this Article. While it is true that securities brokers are
licensed and heavily regulated, the regulation is conducted by a
private, nongovernmental corporation known as the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).22 Although FINRA is a
relatively young organization, it is merely the latest form of
stockbroker self-regulation, which has existed since the late
is John Gittelsohn, U.S. Mortgage Brokers Get Criminal Check, Tests Under New
Rules, Bloomberg (Bloomberg July 21, 2010), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-07-21/mortgage-brokers-get-criminal-checks-with-new-u-s-rules-to-cut-loan-
fraud.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
'9 Id (quoting Senator Feinstein).
20 See Bradley K. Sabel, Mortgage Lending Practice after the Dodd-Frank Act,
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation Blog
(Harvard Nov 16, 2010), online at http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2010/11/16/
mortgage-lending-practice-after-the-dodd-frank-act/ (visited Sept 15, 2013) (discussing
registration of mortgage loan originators).
21 Id.
22 FINRA, the self-regulatory organization (SRO) for securities brokers, is a
combination of the regulatory arms of the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers. See Christopher Cox, Speech by SEC Chairman:
Statement at News Conference Announcing NYSE-NASD Regulatory Merger (SEC Nov
28, 2006), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch112806cc.htm (visited Sept
15, 2013).
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eighteenth century.23 In contrast, Congress has responded to
misbehavior in the mortgage brokerage industry by establishing
new government regulators, mostly at the federal level. In other
words, in response to alleged broker misbehavior in stock
markets (in the 1920s), Congress chose a nongovernmental
regulator; while in response to alleged broker misbehavior in
mortgage markets (in the 2000s), Congress chose a
governmental regulator.
This Article proposes an alternative to direct government
regulation of mortgage brokers: self-regulation of the mortgage
industry that mimics the arguably successful self-regulation of
the securities industry that has occurred over the past two
centuries. Although not without its problems, self-regulation of
securities brokers operates more efficiently than government
regulation. For example, self-regulation allows for industry
expertise to be deployed at low cost and is built on trust and
reciprocity, which reduce enforcement costs. In addition, self-
regulation locates power at its smallest point (a feature known
as "subsidiarity") and encourages efficient resolution of disputes
by ensuring commensurable regulatory intervention. 24 Just as
SWAT teams are not deployed to arrest jaywalkers, so too does
it make sense to handle small-scale violations with non-
governmental sanctions. Most crucially for the mortgage
industry, self-regulation is capable of policing behavior that does
not rise to the level of fraud but is nevertheless socially
undesirable.
This latter benefit-the ability to police ethics-is the
reason self-regulation of securities brokers survived the New
Deal legislation that radically reformed securities regulation.
Speaking to the Hartford Bond Club in 1938, then-Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman William 0. Douglas
defended the New Dealers' decision to perpetuate the historical
practice of self-regulation of securities brokers, which many
viewed as a failure in light of the Stock Market Crash of 1929.
Douglas praised self-regulation because of its ability to get into
the cracks where government cannot reach:
23 See William Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch, 99
Cornell L Rev *16 (forthcoming 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2172935 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
24 For a discussion of these benefits, as well as the costs of self-regulation, see
Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *67-68 (cited in note 23).
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By and large, government can operate satisfactorily only
by proscription. That leaves untouched large areas of
conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of government
regulation but in fact too minute for satisfactory control;
some of it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the
realm of ethics and morality. Into these large areas of
self-government, and self-government alone, can
effectively reach. 25
Specifically, when brokers act in ways that are legal (that
is, nonfraudulent) but not in the interest of their clients, their
fellow brokers have the power to discipline them, including the
levying of fines and the removal of licenses. If all that were
available to regulate the sales of securities were statutory
proscriptions against fraudulent conduct, Douglas argued there
would be socially undesirable amounts of customer losses. While
society tolerates puffery, aggressive sales tactics, and convincing
people to buy things that aren't necessarily good for them in
most consumer transactions, the idea is that securities are too
complex, too important to the larger economy, and too
significant in terms of potential losses for sales to be
unregulated or regulated only by fraud.
Consider, for instance, the way in which stock broker self-
regulation deals with behavior analogous to the nonfraudulent
mortgage behavior described above. Securities brokers are under
an obligation to ensure their recommendations are "suitable" for
their customers. 26 A broker who puts a poor widow in a
speculative penny stock will likely lose his license and be barred
from the industry. This is true even if the widow asked to be
exposed to the risk and the broker's actions did not rise to the
level of fraud. And it will be other members of the industry who
throw him out. Because all brokers suffer from the presence of
bad apples in the industry, they rationally want to raise the
standards of behavior. If it were left to government to police this
transaction, brokers would ironically have much greater leeway
to recommend unsuitable securities, since fraud is much more
difficult to prove than a lack of suitability.
25 Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 186 (Aspen 3d ed 2003)
(quoting William 0. Douglas).
26 See Parts III.B-C.
[ 2013234
229] SELF-REGULATION FOR THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY 235
The ability to use suitability to police bad (but
nonfraudulent) behavior is just one example of the ways in
which self-regulation can be more powerful than government
regulation, and it has particular appeal in the mortgage
industry where consumers may be particularly vulnerable, as
recent experience has shown. Yet the analogous scenario in
mortgage lending-putting a borrower in a mortgage that is not
suitable for his financial position-cannot be punished the same
way; in fact, it is much more difficult for government regulators
to get to this conduct, even though the downside may be far
worse for the consumer.
Government regulation has serious weaknesses. As
Chairman Douglas argued, government regulation is too blunt
to police ethics efficiently. Current law-requiring intent to
deceive, which is difficult to show-forbids a federal suitability
scheme, and passage of a federal statute that would permit the
government to do so is unlikely. Moreover, even if such a statute
were passed, government regulation of this interstitial activity
would still be less efficient than self-regulation. For one, the
Constitution applies to government action, while private
regulation is not subject to due process limitations and other
restrictions on searches and testimony. In addition, if brokers
are forced into a defensive crouch and must don legal armor for
every compliance issue, then the costs of regulation are likely to
increase. Given such a hostile dynamic, there will be no such
thing as informal enforcement.
The rules issued by the CFPB to date (and that are under
consideration) also point to another weakness of government
regulation-a one-size-fits-all approach designed to limit losses
(including political losses) given the constraints of government
enforcement of the rules. In other words, rule makers
understand the inherent limitations of government enforcement,
and therefore must write rules that will be optimal under those
circumstances. The new QRM rules, for instance, are thought to
be effective bans on a vast amount of former and current
mortgage activity. Mortgage bankers report that the new rules
will further constrict lending to only the most qualified
borrowers, and even then, not for certain types of loans available
in the past. 27
27 See Clea Benson, Housing Industry Awaits Down-Payment Rule for Mortgages,
Bloomberg (Bloomberg Jan 17, 2013), online at http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2013-01-
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This may be why the market for subprime mortgage loans
has dried up entirely, while the markets for other types of
subprime credit, which are not subject to the new regulations,
have begun to thrive.28 There may be borrowers for whom
subprime mortgage loans are appropriate, but the banks and
brokers may fear lending to these borrowers on terms that may
later be judged, by juries or prosecutors, to be fraudulent. This
fear would be lessened if other mortgage brokers sat in
judgment of lending decisions. Compared with industry
outsiders, other brokers have better information, and therefore
are likely to be more trusted by the accused.
The argument in this paper is that, however effective the
federal approach to mortgage industry regulation is likely to be,
there are aspects of such regulation that would be better
administered by the industry itself, subject, of course, to
oversight by the government to protect against the threat of
cartelization by industry insiders. To make the case for self-
regulation as a compliment to government regulation in the
mortgage industry, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly
discusses some of the problems that occurred during the recent
mortgage crisis, comparing these problems to pathologies in the
securities markets. Part II discusses in more detail the reforms
implemented to reduce losses in the mortgage market, pointing
out some pros and cons. Part III then offers an alternative: self-
regulation of the mortgage industry, drawing on the experience
of self-regulation in the securities industry. This Part does so by
briefly discussing the FINRA example, looking specifically at
how the doctrine of "suitability" is an important concept that
could be deployed in the mortgage context. Part IV offers some
tentative conclusions.
I. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY
This Part briefly explores the various pathologies of the
mortgage market as it existed prior to the regulatory reforms of
18/housing-industry-awaits-down-payment-rule-for-mortgages.htm (visited Sept 15,
2013). Interviews of several mortgage bankers and independent mortgage brokers
conducted by the author in January 2013 support this view.
m See Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Tara Siegel Bernard, Lenders Again Dealing
Credit to Risky Clients, NY Times Al (Apr 11, 2012) ("The push for subprime borrowers
has not extended to the mortgage market, which remains closed to all but the most
creditworthy.").
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the Dodd-Frank Act, the SAFE Act, and the rules promulgated
thereunder.
A. Baseline Problems
Buying a home is the largest and most important consumer
transaction most Americans will ever make. Although the
government strongly encourages homeownership, 2 9 investing in
an individual house is also one of the most foolish investments
one can make. There are at least four reasons for this.
First, for nearly all Americans a housing investment is
undiversified, making it particularly likely to cause losses for
the homeowner as investor. If house prices fall in one's
neighborhood, the losses are generally not offset by potential
gains elsewhere, since a person typically does not hedge her
investment in a house with an offsetting portfolio of other
investments, whatever those might be. In contrast, when most
people invest in stocks or other securities, they do so in a
diversified way, holding a basket of uncorrelated bets, such as
those offered by mutual funds, which neutralizes the
idiosyncratic risk of investment in a particular company.30 As a
matter of uncontested theory, investing in a house is a terrible
idea.31
Second, a housing investment is illiquid. Selling a home into
a downwardly trending market is time consuming and can
result in a sharply reduced price. In addition, moving entails
financial, social, and psychological costs that reduce the ability
of individuals to get out of housing investments quickly.
Individuals may endure large losses in housing investments that
they would not in other areas because their jobs, friends, school,
social networks, and other aspects of their lives are wound up in
where they live. If a city or neighborhood starts to decay and
home prices begin to drop, any unwinding of the investment will
29 The decision to buy (rather than to rent) a home is one encouraged by years of
federal tax policy, various federal statutes, and by a variety of quasi-governmental
agencies set up during the Great Depression to help people realize the "American dream"
of home ownership.
3 This is the central lesson of Modern Portfolio Theory. See generally, Harry M.
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J Fin 77 (1952).
31 Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Economist: Housing Is a Lousy Investment, WSJ Real Time
Economics Blog (Wall St J Jan 5th, 2010), online at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/
01/05/fed-economist-housing-is-a-lousy-investment/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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take time and likely generate far larger losses than if the
investment were in a similarly collapsing stock or bond.
Third, housing investments are often quite complex. While
long-term, fixed-rate mortgages with 20 percent down payments
were the norm for generations, the high interest rates of the
1970s and the financial innovations of the past few decades have
dramatically expanded the number of mortgage products and
the menu of choices available to borrowers. 32 Adjustable-rate
mortgages, which became common in the early 2000s, are one
example. The recent housing boom also saw the use of teaser
rates and complex interest rate formulas tied to indices such as
LIBOR and huge variation in the down payments and terms of
typical loans. 33 As complexity increases, vulnerable borrowers
will suffer greater expected losses, both because of mistakes and
because they will become targets of unscrupulous brokers.
Fourth, innovation made housing more readily available as
an investment, but with increased risk. During the subprime
mortgage boom, the quality of mortgage underwriting fell
dramatically. Down payments averaged just 2 percent in 2005,
compared with 20 percent over the past several decades. 34 In
that same year, almost half of buyers made no down payment at
all.35 These investments may have made sense for some
investors, but for those investors who were lured into homes
based on false assurances of ability to repay, the results were
the loss of more suitable investment opportunities and
residential displacement.
The bursting of the housing bubble in 2008, which led to the
worst financial crisis in the past eight decades, is a stark
example of the danger of investing in housing. In the past few
years, consumer losses from investments in housing have been
substantial. Recent experience suggests the process of buying a
home is fraught with potential pitfalls for consumers and that
32 See Souphala Chomsisengphet and Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of
the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 Fed Reserve Bank of St Louis Rev 31, 33 (Jan-Feb
2006) (charting the interest and foreclosure rates of subprime and prime mortgages over
time). See generally Joe Peek, A Call to ARMs: Adjustable Rate Mortgages in the 1980s,
New Eng Econ Rev 47 (Mar-Apr 1990).
33 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at
10411 (cited in note 8).
3 Steve Cook, Down Payments Fall to Three Year Low, Real Estate Economy Watch
(Reecon Advisors, Inc Nov 12, 2012), online at http://www.realestateeconomywatch.com/
2012/11/downpayments-fall-to-three-year-low/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
3 Id.
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financial innovation had the effect of pushing losses further
down the income distribution, to parties less able to bear them.
B. Potential Market Pathologies
A variety of potential pathologies or pitfalls exist in the
mortgage market. Importantly, these are quite similar to the
problems that occur in transactions involving consumers
investing in securities.
First, there is widespread ignorance on the part of
consumer-investors. As noted above, news accounts are filled
with stories of homeowners allegedly duped into taking out
mortgages they could not expect to pay, especially after teaser
rates expired. 36 Some recent evidence bears out this claim.
Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette, and Stephan Meier found in
a 2010 paper a "large and statistically significant negative
correlation between numerical ability and various measures of
delinquency and default" on mortgages. 37 They found that
foreclosures were two-thirds less likely for individuals with the
highest facility with numbers than for individuals with the
lowest facility, even after controlling for social and economic
differences. 38 Strikingly, nearly 30 percent of the worst
performers on simple math questions believed they had fixed-
rate mortgages while they actually had adjustable-rate
mortgages. 39
This problem of vulnerable consumers is present in the
securities context as well. A recent Dodd-Frank Act-mandated
study on financial literacy, conducted by the SEC, found a
stunning lack of basic financial literacy among average
3 For one anecdote, see bravenewfilms, Dan's Foreclosure Story (YouTube Mar 5,
2009), online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-5iZBRrP5J5Q (visited Sept 15, 2013).
If I am permitted a personal anecdote, during the height of the housing bubble, a broker
offered to reduce the payments on my mortgage by about 30 percent using a loan with a
1 percent teaser rate. When I asked what happened after the teaser rate expired in three
months, he told me he would automatically roll over the loan to another lender offering a
similar teaser rate. One can see how this type of deal could be particularly appealing,
especially for those without knowledge of financial markets.
37 Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette, and Stephan Meier, Financial Literacy and
Subprime Mortgage Delinquency: Evidence from a Survey Matched to Administrative
Data *1 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2010-10 Apr 2010), online at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/wp/working-paper_2010-10.cfm (visited Sept 15, 2013).
3 Id.
39 Id at *3.
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investors.40 The report concluded that "investors have a weak
grasp of elementary financial concepts and lack critical
knowledge of ways to avoid investment fraud."4 1 Other reports
support this finding. In 2009, FINRA's survey of investors found
that only about half of those surveyed understood that investing
in a portfolio of securities (through a mutual fund) provides a
safer return than investing in a single company.42
Second, bad actors in both the mortgage and securities
brokerage industries target particularly vulnerable types of
individuals. The archetypal case of a broker taking advantage of
widows and orphans is not just the stuff of legend. Many of the
cases pursued by FINRA, alleging fraud or less, involve
vulnerable individuals, be they unsophisticated, inattentive,
non-English speakers, or the like. The same is true for the
mortgage industry, as noted above. The reason these individuals
are targeted is plain. As Gerardi, Goette, and Meier noted,
individuals with poor math skills make easier prey. In addition,
the elderly generally have worse financial literacy. For instance,
in a 2007 study by the Investor Protection Trust, nearly 50
percent of elderly investors mistakenly believed securities
registered with the SEC are therefore "safe" solely by virtue of
such registration. 4 3 While all investors may be equally
vulnerable to outright fraud, unsophisticated investors-in
mortgages or in securities-are more susceptible to
nonfraudulent wrongs, such as making too many trades
("churning") or suggesting economically illogical investment
decisions. These are the cases where policing ethics is vital.
Third, investors, and even courts and regulators, may be
ignorant about the nature of good regulations. More specifically,
the type of information and protection investors say that they
want is often not what they should want. For instance, in the
SEC's recent study of financial literacy, very few respondents
40 See SEC, Study Regarding Financial Literacy Among Investors iii (SEC Aug
2012), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-
partl.pdf (visited on Sept 15, 2013).
41 Id.
42 Applied Research and Consulting LLC, Financial Capability in the United States:
Initial Report of Research Findings from the 2009 National Survey, 40 (FINRA Investor
Education Foundation Dec 2009), online at http://www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/
foundation/@foundation/documents/foundation/pl20536.pdf (visited Apr 15, 2013).
' Infogroup/OCR, Elder Investment Fraud and Financial Exploitation, 42 (Investor
Protection Trust June 15, 2010), online at http://www.investorprotection.org/downloads/
EIFFESurveyReport.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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believed they needed trade confirmation information about
"whether their financial intermediary received compensation
from a third party for sending the order to them [or] the capacity
in which their financial intermediary acted."44 Instead,
respondents preferred receiving information such as the price at
which their stock trades were made. This may seem sensible,
but it is not. The way stock trades are made by brokers leaves
significant room for nonfraudulent advantage-taking, which
would be revealed by the first type of information, but not the
second. For instance, knowing whether the broker was paid by a
third party to route a particular trade to a particular exchange
or whether the broker was acting as a broker (that is, simply
matching trades) or a dealer (that is, selling shares from his own
dealer inventory) is essential to knowing whether the sale
occurred at the best price available. Knowing the sale price will
not reveal this information to the investor.
A good example is the case of Shivangi v Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.45 An investor sued his broker for failing to
disclose in a post-sale trade confirmation that the broker
received higher compensation for trades in which the broker,
Dean Witter, was a market maker 46 than for other trades.47 The
court dismissed the claim based on the conclusion that "the
evidence did not establish that the compensation system
affected the price of the stock." 48 In fact, the court noted that in
the factual situation of the case, the "customer pays less than he
would in [the other situation]." 49 But what the court missed, and
what the SEC study suggests investors miss as well, is that the
Dean Witter compensation system-which the investor did not
know about-created an incentive for the broker to steer
customers to stocks in which Dean Witter was a market maker.
This served Dean Witter's, as opposed to the investor's, interest.
44 SEC Staff, Study Regarding Financial Literacy Among Investors at xviii (cited in
note 40).
4 825 F2d 885 (5th Cir 1987).
46 Market makers are brokers that agree to buy and sell stock at any price, thereby
creating an orderly and liquid market for the security. This is in contrast to when the
broker merely acts as an intermediary, matching a buyer and a seller. A broker prefers,
all else being equal, to sell shares from the brokers' inventory, since this reduces the risk
of holding those shares.
4 Shivangi, 825 F2d at 885.
4 Id at 889.
'9 Id at 887.
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In other words, the broker may have given Mr. Shivangi the best
possible price on the worst possible stock. Neither Mr. Shivangi
nor the court realized this possibility, but any broker sitting in
judgment of Dean Witter would recognize the potential mischief.
The mortgage context is replete with similar examples.
Individuals might press for clearer disclosure about the interest
rate charged, when they would actually benefit more from other
disclosures, such as those that would allow a mortgagor to
determine whether the product being sold is one that is in the
interest of the mortgagor or the mortgagee. Of course, the
operative question then becomes who is best positioned to
deliver the optimal disclosure to consumers. As an ex ante
matter, there are reasons to believe the answer is other brokers,
who have experience and expertise in these matters. In addition,
brokers acting as industry policemen may be less susceptible to
the political pressures of ignorant citizens or special interests,
especially if the policing is done in a way that reflects the
brokerage industry as a whole. In addition, ex post industry
policing of disclosure-self-regulators sitting in ethical judgment
of the kind of behavior in Shivangi-may be the lower cost
option, as opposed to letting prosecutors try to make federal
cases.
Fourth, it is quite tricky to sort between ex ante "rational"
and "irrational" investment decisions, whether such investments
are in securities or homes. Since disputes only arise when
investments turn out badly, adjudications face a serious
hindsight bias issue. Expertise, experience, and knowledge can
make this problem less severe, and self-regulation is the most
effective way of quickly and efficiently imbuing the adjudicative
process with these qualities. Although self-regulation creates the
potential for brokers to protect their own and subvert the
regulatory process, this concern exists in any regulatory
system-governmental or otherwise-as the large public choice
literature demonstrates.50 In addition, the FINRA experience
offers a variety of mechanisms for reducing the risk of such self-
serving behavior.51
50 See, for example, James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, 77
Am Econ Rev 243 (1987) (Nobel Prize lecture).
s' See Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *15-29 (cited in
note 23).
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C. Summary
From this analysis of the problems afflicting the mortgage
industry, four key points come into focus.
First, the problem of misbehaving brokers is a generic one.
Whether the intermediary in the financial transaction is a
mortgage broker or a securities broker, the potential for agency
costs to translate into abuse exists just the same. There are
faithful and unfaithful brokers; a key regulatory challenge is
finding the most efficient way to differentiate between the two.
Conditions and context matter, of course, but when it comes to
the legal challenges, there are more similarities than differences
between the two scenarios.
Second, it is in the rational self-interest of brokerage
industry participants to regulate themselves. Unlike those
industries where misbehaving actors impose costs only on those
outside of the industry while benefiting their customers, 52 the
misbehavior of brokers harms customers and thereby imposes
costs on other brokers. The natural tendency of brokers to want
to increase the overall quality of brokers in the industry can be
used by the law-in a type of outsourcing transaction-to reduce
the overall cost of regulation.
Third, the difference between good and bad brokers from a
social welfare perspective is not necessarily something that can
be cleanly differentiated by the law. Many of the difficult
problems in brokerage relationships lie deep in the cracks,
where legal rules are too blunt to operate. This is the point
Douglas made in his speech in Hartford. 53 The law is
adversarial, works from the outside in, is subject to
constitutional constraints, is bounded by ex post facto concerns,
and is made and administered by nonexperts. While judges may
claim to "know it when they see it," individuals who do the same
work every day for their living are much more able to see, and
know when they see, unethical actions. In addition, by acting
collectively through a sanctioned self-regulatory organization
with a government imprimatur, this approach can overcome the
problems associated with other private regulatory efforts.
5' For example, when a factory emits pollutants that harm downstream or
downwind farmers, but does not have to bear these costs, the factory's customers benefit
through lower costs (paid by the farmers).
5 See note 25 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, the current model of securities regulation is a
complex mix of public force and private ordering that tries to
obtain the benefits of self-regulation while reducing the ability
of self-regulation to become self-serving regulation. Douglas
again provides the imagery-his model of self-regulation is one
in which "[g]overnment . . . keep[s] the shotgun, so to speak,
behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but
with the hope it would never have to be used."54 The government
has monitored and altered the nature of self-regulation in the
securities brokerage context over the past century, guiding the
self-regulatory process in a way ostensibly designed to improve
regulatory efficiency.55 Although the New Dealers originally
proposed displacing private regulation with government
regulation, today's hybrid model prevailed and has thrived in
large part because of the real efficiencies available from self-
regulation in the brokerage context.56
The next Part of this Article describes how the government's
response to broker misconduct in the mortgage context
unfortunately failed to use the analogous securities broker
context as a model. Instead, the government's response deployed
a pure governmental model.
II. MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS
In contrast to the continued use of private regulators to
regulate stock brokers following the stock market crash of 1929,
the federal response to consumer losses in mortgages has been
purely governmental. There have been three primary responses
to the problem of misbehaving mortgage brokers.
A. Litigation
The first response to mortgage broker misbehavior has been
criminal prosecution by federal and state governments of
brokers who committed fraud. Hundreds of these types of suits
are now pending and countless other investigations are
" William 0. Douglas, Democracy and Finance: The Addresses and Public
Statement of William 0. Douglas as Member and Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission 82 (Yale University Press 1940).
55 See Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *16-26 (cited in
note 23).
* See id at*20.
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ongoing.57 One infamous case involves a convicted armed robber
who ran a mortgage brokerage firm in California.58 At the time,
California-like many other states-did not require a mortgage
broker to have a license. The individuals involved allegedly ran
a bogus brokerage that "lure[d] borrowers into refinancing their
homes on false promises of low interest rates and minimal
fees."5 9 In addition, the brokers forged documents and
fraudulently obtained over $1 million in fees on tens of millions
in phony loans.60 The brokers are facing over 60 federal counts of
fraud.61
This lawsuit and others like it are justified, and any
sensible regulatory regime will include criminal penalties for
fraud. This Article's proposal for self-regulation neither
precludes nor crowds out this type of regulation. Indeed,
misbehavior in securities markets is policed by many different
regulators-not just FINRA, but also the SEC, the Department
of Justice (DOJ), as well as state regulators and prosecutors.
Going after the worst fraudsters is an important government
regulatory response, because government sanctions (including
prison time) may be important where harm is large, where
specific deterrence is important, and where general deterrence is
served by imposing large penalties (for example, where the
probability of detection is low). 62 Since self-regulation does not
preclude government enforcement in cases where such penalties
are warranted (and only available from government regulators),
we can consider just the incremental gain from adding self-
regulation to the regulatory mix.
5 The Department of Justice (DOJ) has several working groups specifically focused
on mortgage fraud. For information on the Mortgage Fraud Working Group and the
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group, see Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force, Task Force Leadership (Stopfraud.gov), online at
http://www.stopfraud.gov/leadership.html (visited Sept 15, 2013). The DOJ's 2013
budget request included an entry for $55 million in additional resources to focus on
mortgage fraud. This money was intended to support "40 FBI agents, 184 attorneys, 49
in-house investigators, 31 forensic accountants, 16 paralegals, and 8 support staff." DOJ,
FY 2013 Budget Request: Financial and Mortgage Fraud Fact Sheet *1, online at
http: /www.justice.gov/jmd/2013factsheets/financial-mortgage-fraud.pdf (visited Sept 15,
2013).
" Gittelsohn, US Mortgage Brokers Get Criminal Check (cited in note 18).
5 Id.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 See generally, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J Political Econ 169 (Mar-Apr 1968).
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The important role played by self-regulation in these cases,
however, is notable. Consider securities fraud: FINRA has about
150 professional staff and a sophisticated computer system that
together monitor and investigate all stock transactions to
identify suspicious trading activity.6 3 These private "police" are
not subject to the typical limitations on government
investigators, which include both constitutional rules (for
example, limiting searches, giving defendants rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and so on) and civil service rules that set
work rules, limit compensation, and the like. Although FINRA
has its own internal constraints on investigations and
prosecutions, these are much looser in all dimensions than
analogous government actions because FINRA is not a state
actor. Most obviously, this means the Constitution does not
constrain FINRA. But, in addition, FINRA employees can be
fired, can be paid for performance, and are not subject to as
significant political constraints, since their actions bet the
reputation of only FINRA rather than the entire US
government. 64 Importantly, FINRA investigations can not only
result in disciplinary sanctions, such as civil fines or license
revocations, but also frequently lead to referrals to government
agencies for civil and criminal proceedings.65
B. Licensure
In response to misbehavior by mortgage brokers, Congress
also passed a national licensing scheme. The SAFE Act requires
that all mortgage brokers obtain a license. 66 Before the SAFE
Act, such licensure was a matter of state law, which was
inconsistent, both as to whether a license was needed and, if so,
as to the requirements to obtain and maintain one. 6 7 The SAFE
Act draws a distinction between brokers employed by banks-
6 For descriptions of FINRA's Securities Observation News Analysis and
Regulation program-dubbed SONAR-and market surveillance group, see Ben Protess,
For Wall Street Watchdog, All Grunt Work, Little Glory, NY Times B7 (Dec 2, 2011).
r On this last point, see, for example, Edward M. lacobucci, Reputational
Economies of Scale, with Application to Law Firms, 14 Am L & Econ Rev 302, 304
(2012).
6 For examples of recent FINRA referrals, see FINRA, 2012: FINRA Year in
Review (FINRA Jan 8, 2013), online at http://www.finra.org/NewsroomlNewsReleases/
2013/Pl97624 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
a SAFE Act § 1504, 122 Stat at 2654, codified at 12 USCA § 5103.
* Gittelsohn, US Mortgage Brokers Get Criminal Check (cited in note 18).
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"covered financial institution[s]"-and independent mortgage
brokers. 68 The former are only obligated to register with the
federal government as brokers under the Nationwide Mortgage
Licensing System and Registry, which involves obtaining federal
registration numbers, undergoing background checks, and being
fingerprinted. Independent brokers, on the other hand, are
required to obtain state-issued licenses as well as register with
the federal government. 69
There is some logic to the distinction between bank and
nonbank brokers. Banks are heavily regulated by various state
and federal agencies and Congress may have reasonably
believed that this supervision is sufficient to prevent the worst
types of abuse by mortgage brokers. Even more important as an
economic matter are the reputational constraints that operate
on large banks and encourage intrabank monitoring of agents to
ensure compliance with the law and the bank's internal rules.
For example, it is unlikely any convicted bank robbers are
working as mortgage brokers at Wells Fargo or any other bank.
But there is also a less charitable explanation of the
different rules for bank-based brokers and independent
mortgage brokers. Lower regulatory costs give banks a
competitive advantage vis-A-vis independent mortgage
brokers. 70 Under this view, arguments about alternative forms
of regulation and reputational constraints are simply a
convenient shield for the anticompetitive benefits of differential
regulation. Banks therefore had an incentive to lobby Congress
and other rule makers to design rules that give banks a cost
advantage over their rivals.
Even if the licensure and regulation process for independent
brokers is identical in cost to the process for bank brokers and
6 Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Public Law 110-289, July 30, 2008, provides
that "an individual may not engage in the business of a loan originator without first (1)
obtaining . . . (A) a registration as a registered loan originator or (B) a license and
registration as a State-licensed loan originator . . . ." Section 1503(7) defines "registered
loan originator" as an individual who, among other things, works at a depository
institution, such as a bank. See id. For the rules implementing the SAFE Act, see
Registration of Mortgage Loan Originators, 75 Fed Reg 44656 (2010), finalized in various
sections of 10 CFR. See also 12 CFR § 1007.103. The rules were promulgated by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; the Federal Reserve System; the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Office of Thrift Supervision; the Farm Credit
Administration; and the National Credit Union Administration.
6 12 CFR § 1008.103.
70 For a discussion of this dynamic, see Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the
Fifth Branch at *56-57 (cited in note 23).
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only different in form, these regulations may still have an
anticompetitive effect. To the extent that bank-based brokers
have a larger asset base over which to spread regulatory costs,
they will have a competitive advantage over independent
brokers.71 It may be the case that the regulation is designed to
have exactly this effect-to drive independent brokers out of the
business and to centralize mortgage brokerage at banks. If this
is the case, it is not obvious why that is a policy improvement.
Independent brokers, to be sure, perpetrated many frauds, but
so too did banks. Moreover, independent brokers provide
services and competition that may be valuable for certain
segments of the market. If there exists a mechanism for
efficiently regulating independent brokers commensurate with
their risk and sensitive to the differential impact of regulatory
costs, it would be preferable to use this approach, as opposed to
a one-size-fits-all approach or an outright ban on certain
transactions regardless of variable costs.
In contrast, FINRA licenses stockbrokers through a unitary
system that is the same in every jurisdiction.72 Brokers take one
or more tests, depending on the type of work they want to do.
The tests are administered by FINRA, as are decisions about
admission, maintenance, suspensions, and revocations. In these
and other matters, FINRA's decision makers are industry and
nonindustry officials, including equal numbers of
representatives from large, medium, and small-sized firms.
FINRA also maintains a readily available database of brokers,
known as the Central Registration Depository. 73 Notably, this
database includes all customer complaints and disciplinary
actions, making it a potent tool for encouraging compliance by
brokers. 74
71 Id at *45-46.
72 The basic broker license is the Series 7 license. See SEC, Series 7 Examination
(SEC Mar 26, 2008), online at http://www.sec.gov/answers/series7.htm (visited Sept 15,
2013).
73 See SEC, Checking Out a Brokerage Firm, Individual Broker, Investment Adviser
Firm, or Individual Investment Adviser (SEC Feb 14, 2012), online at
http: /www.sec.gov/answers/crd.htm (visited Sept 15, 2013).
7 For FINRA's BrokerCheck database, which provides background information on
registered stockbrokers, see FINRA, FINRA BrokerCheck@ - Research Brokers,
Brokerage Firms, Investment Adviser Representatives and Investment Adviser Firms
(FINRA), online at http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
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C. New Agency, New Rules
Finally, Congress passed the Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act (the "Mortgage Act") as Title XIV of the
Dodd-Frank Act. 5 The Mortgage Act delegates to the newly
created CFPB, along with other federal regulators, the authority
to interpret and implement provisions of the Mortgage Act. To
date, about 40 percent of all consumer complaints received by
the CFPB involved mortgages. 6 Although a full treatment of the
Mortgage Act is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief
discussion of its major provisions is instructive.
Subtitle A establishes residential mortgage loan origination
standards, making brokers fiduciaries of their customers and
regulating the maximum amount of broker compensation
(known as a "yield spread premium").77 Under the old regime,
some brokers were more highly compensated when they steered
individuals to high-yield loans.78 The steering and compensation
provisions of the Mortgage Act are designed to remedy this
problem.
Subtitle B of the Mortgage Act puts in place minimum
standards for mortgages.79 The law requires the Federal Reserve
Board to issue regulations that, among other things, require
brokers to consider a consumer's financial situation, such as his
ability to repay, when making a recommendation.8 0 These
provisions apply to all loans, regardless of the size, rates, or fees
involved. In the past, only certain types of loans carried this
obligation.81 Subtitle B also bans certain mortgage features,
such as prepayment penalties and negative amortization, and
' Dodd-Frank Title XIV, 124 Stat at 1376, codified at 15 USCA § 1601 et seq.
76 See CFPB, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Fiscal
Year 2012, 20 (Nov 15, 2012), online at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201211_cfpb-
financial-report-fy-2012.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
7 Dodd-Frank § 1401-1406, 124 Stat at 2137-2142, codified in various sections of
Title 15. For a general discussion of the Mortgage Act and the new rules it entails, see
Sabel, Mortgage Lending Practice after the Dodd-Frank Act (cited in note 20).
7 See, for example, Howell E. Jackson and Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or
Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 Stan J L Bus & Finance 289, 331
(2007) ("Rather, the evidence suggests that mortgage brokers earn substantially more on
loans when yield spread premiums are paid.").
7 Dodd-Frank § 1411-1422, 124 Stat at 2142-2156, codified in various sections of
Title 15.
8 Dodd-Frank § 1411, 124 Stat at 2142, codified at 15 USCA § 1639c(a)(1).
81 This was the case under the old provisions of Regulation Z of the Truth In
Lending Act. See 12 CFR § 226.
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protects consumers against the loss of antideficiency
protection.82 As discussed below, although these are sensible
rules, they are better administered through a self-regulatory
model of suitability than through federal statutory or agency-
based rules.83
Subtitle C deals with so-called high-cost mortgages, which
are: loans whose interest rates exceed the average prime offer
rate by more than 6.5 percentage points; arrangements where
the points paid exceed $20,000 or 5 percent of the value of the
property; or arrangements where prepayment penalties, among
other things, exceed 2 percent of the value of the transaction.84
For these types of mortgages, balloon payments, debt
acceleration, and deferral fees are banned and late charges are
restricted.85 In addition, a mortgagee cannot issue a high-cost
mortgage until it receives certification from a government-
approved counselor that the consumer-mortgagor has been
counseled as to the advisability of taking out the mortgage.86
These counseling services have been developed, implemented,
and monitored by the new Office of Housing Counseling, which
was created by Subtitle D of the Mortgage Act.87 The Office of
Housing Counseling was established within the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to educate consumers, certify
counselors, and collect information about foreclosures and
defaults on home mortgages.88 The counseling requirements in
the Mortgage Act seem designed to address the suitability
concern raised above. However, the approach adopted by the
Office of Housing Counseling is to impose itself as a neutral
third party between a customer and a broker, rather than to
impose the suitability obligation on the broker (as is done in the
securities context).
The remainder of the Mortgage Act sets forth additional
limitations on mortgage practices that were deemed to have
caused problems during the recent mortgage crisis. Subtitle E,
62 Dodd-Frank § 1415, 124 Stat at 2146-2153, codified in various sections of Title
15.
3 See Parts III.C-D.
84 Dodd-Frank § 1431, 124 Stat at 2156, codified at 15 USCA § 1602.
5 Dodd-Frank § 1432-1433, 124 Stat at 2159, codified at 15 USCA § 1639.
8 Dodd-Frank § 1463, 124 Stat at 2162, codified at 15 USCA § 1639.
87 Dodd-Frank § 1442, 124 Stat at 2162, codified at 42 USCA § 3533.
8 Dodd-Frank § 1442, 124 Stat at 2162, codified at 42 USCA § 3533(g)(3).
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among other things, requires that taxes and insurance costs be
escrowed for the first lien mortgage on a principal dwelling
unless the borrower waives this provision in writing.89 This rule
is designed to avoid a homeowner's being "surprised" by large
property taxes and insurance bills, which had been hidden by a
broker trying to reduce the apparent borrowing costs. Subtitle F
puts new obligations on appraisers and regulates the interaction
among brokers, customers, and appraisers.90
As noted above, the new QRM rules, which are not yet
finalized as of this writing, are one example of the CFPB's
governmental, rule-based approach to regulating the mortgage
market. The current version of the QRM rules caps the available
mortgage amounts as a percentage of borrower income, caps
fees, and declares certain types of mortgages (including perhaps
very large ones) as not protected by a safe-harbor against
litigation.91 Regulators are also considering a mandatory
minimum down payment,92 and mortgage bankers believe that
the market will dry up entirely for loans not meeting the QRM
standards. 93
D. Contrasting Approaches
The Mortgage Act and the SAFE Act are governmental
responses, more particularly federal, agency-based responses, to
the problems in the mortgage market. These two statutes ban a
variety of activities and types of products, and the bans are
enforceable by federal and state agencies, especially the CFPB.
They also require various efforts at monitoring brokers and
educating consumers, again to be done by governmental entities.
This approach stands in stark contrast to the approach
taken by the New Deal Congress in the wake of the closest
historical analog-the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the
ensuing Great Depression. Then, the solution was self-
" Dodd-Frank § 1461, 124 Stat at 2178, codified at 15 USCA § 1639(d).
" Dodd-Frank § 1471-1480, 124 Stat at 2185-2202.
9' See CFPB, Proposed Amendments to the Ability to Repay Standards under the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed Reg at 6623 (cited in note 15). See also
Benson, Housing Industry Awaits Down-Payment Rule for Mortgages (cited in note 27).
92 See Benson, Housing Industry Awaits Down-Payment Rule for Mortgages (cited in
note 27).
9 Id ("Whichever of these standards is the most conservative is the one that you're
going to adhere to.").
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regulation.94 When Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, securities brokers had
been self-regulating for nearly 200 years and the idea of
imposing a federal regulatory structure on the thousands of
securities brokers was "a little bit like trying to build a structure
out of dry sand."95 With the Maloney Act of 1938,96 Congress
chose to keep the self-regulatory model in place, and
supplemented it with additional government oversight. In fact,
the 1938 Maloney Act amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act expanded self-regulation to cover several thousand
previously unregulated brokers in the so-called over-the-counter
market.97
In contrast, there was not a history of self-regulation of
mortgage brokers for the Dodd-Frank Congress to use as its wet
sand in building a new regulatory structure. Perhaps the
mortgage industry lacked a self-regulatory organization (SRO)
because mortgage lending existed largely within already-
regulated banks. Independent brokers were a relatively small
and new part of the mortgage game, which was traditionally
played by banks, savings and loans, and other financial
institutions. In contrast, self-regulation of stock brokers started
in the late 1700s precisely because there was no existing
regulatory apparatus in place.98 The New York legislature made
stock brokerage contracts unenforceable in 1792, necessitating
private law as a mechanism for allowing the nascent brokerage
industry to continue. 99 This was the seed that produced more
than 200 years of continuous self-regulation. With no such
necessity in the mortgage industry, perhaps other reasons for
self-regulation-for example, to build industry reputation-were
insufficient to generate a robust SRO for the mortgage industry.
Whatever the reason, this lack of an existing self-regulatory
tradition presents an obstacle to self-regulation for the mortgage
9' See Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *20-22 (cited in
note 23).
9 Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 185 (cited in note 25) (quoting
former SEC Commission George C. Mathews).
9 Maloney Act, Pub L No 75-719, 52 Stat 1070 (1938), codified as amended at 15
USC § 78o-3, et seq.
97 Id. See also Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 183-89 (cited in note
25).
* Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *16 (cited in note 23).
* Idat*17.
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industry. But, as discussed below, it is not an insurmountable
one.
III. AN SRO FOR THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY
This Part proposes an alternative regime for regulation of
the mortgage industry, namely, the creation of a self-regulatory
organization analogous to those currently serving as the
primary regulators of stock and commodities brokers. The
trillions of dollars traded in US equity and commodities markets
are regulated primarily by private, for-profit corporations
funded by members of the industry and representing the
industry. FINRA is the primary regulator of stockbrokers; the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (like other commodities
exchanges) regulates brokers on its exchange.100 Securities
broker self-regulation has a long and successful history-almost
two centuries-of regulating complex and perilous consumer
transactions based on the rational self-interest of market
participants.101 In addition, a bill is currently pending in
Congress to create a self-regulatory model for financial
advisors. 102 The logic of self-regulation in these areas seems
fairly applicable in the mortgage industry as well.
A. The Logic of Self-Regulation
There is a compelling argument for self-regulation in
industries where brokers intermediate financial transactions.
The argument is based on the self-interest of the brokers
themselve.1 03 Self-regulation can be effective if the costs of
misbehavior are borne generally by members of the profession,
while the benefits inure only to the misbehaving members. This
is likely the case where an intangible service, such as brokerage
services or investment advice, is being purveyed and customers
'n For a list of the major SROs, see SEC, Self-Regulatory Organization Rulemaking
(SEC Dec 13, 2012), online at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml (visited Sept 15, 2013).
101 See Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *16 (cited in note
23).
102 See Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, HR 4624, 112th Cong, 2d Sess
(Apr 25, 2013), in 158 Cong Rec D563-01 (Jun 6, 2012). See also Mark Schoeff Jr, Bachus
Bill Pushed Back, Washington Insider (InvestmentNews June 11, 2012), online at
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120611/BLOGO7/120619989# (visited Sept 15,
2013).
1o3 See Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *10 (cited in note
23).
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cannot readily distinguish ex ante between "good" and "bad"
service. In the absence of the ability to do so, customers will
discount the amount they are willing to pay by the probability of
being cheated by a bad service provider. If good brokers cannot
credibly signal their quality, they will be unable to charge the
full price of their services and will therefore exit the market,
reduce the quality of their service, or find ways to cheat, such as
recommending excessive trading (known as "churning") in
customer accounts. Accordingly, the overall quality of brokers
will fall. Good brokers therefore have strong incentives to
identify bad brokers or to remove them from the industry, since
doing so would allow good brokers to charge more for their
services.
Brokerage and other financial activity is amenable to self-
regulation because the harm caused by bad brokers-the ones
taking too little care or engaging in too much problematic
activity-is primarily borne by the individuals who are in a
contractual relationship with those brokers. When the broker
cheats, the customer loses.104 In contrast, when a factory
pollutes, its customers gain because some of the costs of
production are borne by others. Polluters therefore do not have
strong incentives to police other polluters and thus self-
regulation makes less sense in contexts such as environmental
regulation.
To be clear, self-regulation is not a panacea. Regulatory
failures abound in securities and commodities markets. Some of
these are familiar to the public, like the Bernie Madoff Ponzi
scheme and the meltdown of MF Global, while others, like the
"back-office" crisis of the late 1960s, are not.105 But the fact that
self-regulation is not perfect is not surprising or necessarily an
indictment of it. The relevant comparison is not between self-
regulation and Nirvana, but between self-regulation and
government regulation. From that viewpoint, self-regulation
1' To be sure, there may be some risk-called systemic risk-that customers' losses
will harm other customers, but for most brokerage deals, this "financial pollution" is
minimal.
'0' For a discussion of the back-office crisis and the MF Global meltdown, see
Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *44 (cited in note 23). The
Madoff Ponzi scheme is widely covered in the media. See, for example, Diana B.
Henriques and Zachery Kouwe, U.S. Arrests A Top Trader In Vast Fraud, NY Times Al
(Dec 12, 2008).
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seems attractive both in practice and as a matter of theory.10 6
Self-regulation can reach behaviors government regulation
cannot, and it can do it with lower costs and greater precision,
given the expertise the industry itself can bring to bear on
regulatory questions. 107
Government regulation, of some form, is perhaps a
necessary backstop against two obvious problems. First is the
possibility that the industry will not be sufficiently diligent in
protecting the public interest. The industry may be willing to
tolerate certain policies among its members that are good for the
industry but bad for society-but not apparent to customers or
of sufficiently small size so as not to motivate them to collective
action to remedy the problem. One example is the practice-
which existed for many years-of brokers quoting stock prices
only in even eighths of a dollar, thus increasing spreads and
therefore profits.108 This "gentlemen's agreement" was revealed
by an academic paper and then used by the government as
leverage to change some practices of the SRO.109 There is always
a risk of cartelization when an industry acts collectively, but this
is simply another cost that must be compared with the benefits
of self-regulation. Monitoring self-regulation to ensure the
regulation does not become a shield against more effective
government regulation or a tool of industry self-interest (or the
self-interest of subgroups within the industry) is an important
governmental function.
The second potential problem with self-regulation is the
necessary limitation on the types of penalties that private
regulators can impose. This suggests an inevitable role for
government as well. Only the government can impose criminal
sanctions, and the work of Gary Becker suggests that for
certain, hard-to-detect violations, criminal sanctions may be
necessary to ensure optimal deterrence.110 Large fines may also
work, but these have been subject to recent criticism in the self-
106 See generally Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch (cited in
note 23).
107 See id at *66.
108 William G. Christie and Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid
Odd-Eight Quotes?, 49 J Finance 1813 (Dec 1994).
109 Id. For a discussion of this paper and its influence on regulatory policy, see
Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch at *26 (cited in note 23).
110 See Becker, 76 J Political Econ at 169 (cited in note 62).
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regulatory context"' and, in any event, are not likely to be
effective against individuals or small brokers with few assets
and reputations that are not very valuable. Despite the
necessity of government involvement, self-regulators are
currently playing a vital-if constitutionally suspect-role in
ongoing criminal investigations, such as those for securities
fraud and insider trading. Even if self-regulation is rendered
less effective by further curtailment of its ability to collect fines
(other than merely using fining as leverage), or by constraints
on its ability to partner with government agents without
complying with the Constitution, there is still a vital regulatory
role that can be played (and would be played) by industry self-
regulation in the area of ethics policing.
B. FINRA
In Becoming the Fifth Branch, William Birdthistle and I
describe in detail the reasons why self-regulation started and
has flourished for securities brokers, using FINRA as a
sustained example.112 FINRA is a private, for-profit corporation
funded by securities brokers. It is the combination of the old
National Association of Securities Dealers and the self-
regulatory arms of the stock exchanges, such as the New York
Stock Exchange. FINRA writes rules-its rulebook is 1374 pages
of 8-point font! 1 3-audits brokers, investigates brokers for
violations of its rules and federal and state law, brings
enforcement actions, sits in judgment of brokers accused of rule
or law violations, manages an arbitration process involving
thousands of cases per year, and engages in widespread broker
and customer education.114 In short, FINRA does nearly
n1 See, for example, Fiero v Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc, 660 F3d
569, 574 (2d Cir 2011) (holding that FINRA does not have the authority to bring court
actions to collect fines for disciplinary violations by members).
u1 See generally, Birdthistle and Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch (cited in
note 23).
113 See FINRA, FINRA Manual (FINRA 2013), online at http://finra.complinet.com/
en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementLid=1 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
11 For a description of FINRA, see FINRA, More About FINRA (FINRA 2013),
online at http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/P125239 (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also
FINRA, 2011 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report, 8 (FINRA 2012), online at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/pl27
312.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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everything that the SAFE Act and Mortgage Act require of a
variety of state and federal regulators, plus much more.
FINRA does so in a manner that has significant benefits
over a governmental regulatory model, at least in this case in
which the industry's incentives are more aligned with social
goals than could be said in other industries. FINRA employees
are not civil servants, so they are not subject to the limitations
on compensation and promotion that may reduce the efficacy of
government regulators.115 FINRA is managed by industry
experts, meaning its rules and decisions are informed by inside
information, as opposed to agency rules, which are informed
only by the biased sample of industry expertise who participate
in the Notice and Comment rulemaking procedures. FINRA
prosecutors and judges are industry insiders to some extent, so
they are more trusted than outside regulators would be; this
lowers regulatory costs and reduces the possibility of type 1 and
type 2 errors.116 FINRA is also not subject to the Constitution,
since it is not a state actor. This means that its audits,
investigations, and prosecutions-including such punishments
as taking away brokers' licenses and imposing fines-are not
subject to constitutional or statutory rules that limit searches
and compelled testimony, provide for representation by counsel,
protect due process, and impose any of the other myriad
protections those being investigated by the government have.
These advantages, especially expertise and freedom of
operation, allow FINRA specifically, and self-regulation more
generally, to get into the regulatory cracks alluded to in William
0. Douglas's Hartford Bond Club speech.117 Being an ethics
policeman is not a governmental function, but a private one:
"Into these large areas[,] self-government, and self-government
alone, can effectively reach."118 To illustrate this, the next Part
considers the doctrine of "suitability" for stockbrokers.
Suitability is a good example of the kind of work best done by
self-regulation and the kind of problem that severely plagued
the mortgage industry.
" See, for example, M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator
Performance, 85 S Cal L Rev 1003 (2011-2012) (discussing the low-powered incentives of
bureaucratic pay and recommending pay-for-performance for banking regulators).
116 Type 1 errors are false positives-finding a violation where there is none-and
type 2 errors are false negatives-finding no violation where there is one in fact.
117 See note 25 and accompanying text.
us See Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 186 (cited in note 25).
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C. Suitability
"Suitability" is the core stockbroker duty.119 The duty is easy
to define: brokers have an obligation to take steps to ensure the
securities they recommend to their clients are "suitable" for
them. 120 Brokers who are adjudged to have made unsuitable
recommendations to their customers are subject to punishment
by the SRO such as fines, suspension, or a bar from the
industry.121 In extreme cases, unsuitable recommendations may
also amount to fraud and therefore result in heavy civil and
even criminal liability.122 But because of the difficulty of proving
fraudulent intent and the administrative costs of running a legal
proceeding, as opposed to a private one, civil and criminal
liability is rare. In addition to these ex post penalties-or more
likely, because of them-firms also engage in private law
enforcement by training and monitoring brokers to ensure
compliance with the rules.
The typical objects of allegedly unsuitable investment
recommendations are the proverbial "widows and orphans." The
classic example of an unsuitable investment is a large holding of
a speculative high-tech stock by an elderly widow on a fixed
income. The personal circumstances of an investor are relevant
to-and possibly determinative of- the amount of risk a broker
us Suitability is a key contributor to FINRA fines, and in 2011 thirty brokers were
barred for making unsuitable recommendations. See Deborah G. Heilzer, Brian L.
Rubin, and Andrew W. McCormick, Annual Sutherland FINRA Sanction Study Shows
Enforcement Actions on the Rise (Sutherland Feb 28, 2011), online at
http://www.sutherland.comlNewsCommentary/Press-Releases/74715/Annual-
Sutherland-FINRA-Sanction-Study-Shows-Enforcement-Actions-on-the-Rise (visited
Sept 15, 2013).; Deborah G. Heilzer, Brian L. Rubin, and Andrew W. McCormick,
Sutherland Focus Report #4- FINRA Suitability Sanctions Rise in 2011 (Sutherland Mar
16, 2012), online at http://www.sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/Press-Releases/74992/
Sutherland-Focus-Report-4-FINRA-Suitability-Sanctions-Rise-in-2011 (visited on Sept
15, 2013).
120 See FINRA Rule 2111, online at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display
viewall.html?rbid=2403&elementid=9859&print=1 (visited Sept 15, 2013). For a
discussion of Rule 2111, see FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25 (FINRA May 2012), online
at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pl26
431.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
121 For violations of the FINRA suitability rules, the FINRA Sanctions Guidelines
recommend a fine of $2,500 to $75,000, and a suspension of 10 to 365 days. See FINRA,
Sanction Guidelines, 94 (FINRA 2011), online at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@enfl@sg/documents/industry/p011038.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). For
egregious cases, the guidelines recommend a suspension of up to two years or a bar from
the industry. See id.
122 See, for example, Clark v John Lamula Investors, Inc, 583 F2d 594 (2d Cir 1978).
258 [ 2013
229] SELF-REGULATION FOR THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY 259
recommends to that individual. 123 Younger investors should take
more risk. They are currently earning money and have many
years to continue doing so. They have more time for investments
that start badly to recover. And they are less likely to have
emergency expenses, such as large, unforeseen medical
expenses. Young investors can therefore take bigger risks with
their investments and still be relatively conservative in the long
run. Older investors, by contrast, may be living on a fixed
income and unable to bear large, short-term losses. Beyond age,
several other factors are also relevant: for example, income,
wealth, risk preferences, familial situation, employment history
and prospects, and knowledge. A broker should take account of
these to tailor recommendations to the circumstances of the
individual investor. 124 The concept is simple enough: what is a
good investment for a wealthy man of thirty may be a terrible
one for that same man at seventy or a different thirty-year-old
living paycheck-to-paycheck.
The canonical cases are in just this vein. Consider the
famous case Clark v John Lamula Investors, Inc.125 The broker
recommended to a retired school teacher in her late fifties that
she invest nearly her entire divorce settlement of $138,000 in
junk bonds promising a double-digit return. 126 When the bonds
dropped in value, the investor sued, alleging that the broker
committed securities fraud by making an unsuitable investment
recommendation. She won. 127
Although the case seems rightly decided on suitability
grounds, the issue is not completely straightforward. Brokers
rarely act without guidance, since they are in the business of
pleasing their customers. In Clark, the plaintiff-investor
instructed the broker to recommend an investment that would
yield returns in excess of 10 percent per year.128 Investments
yielding an expected 10 percent annual returns are not low risk.
123 For a discussion of the contours of the suitability rule, see FINRA Regulatory
Notice 11-25, Know Your Customer and Suitability: New Implementation Date for and
Additional Guidance on the Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Know-Your-Customer
and Suitability Obligations (May 2011), online at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@regA@notice/documents/notices/pl23701.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
124 See id.
125 583 F2d 594 (2d Cir 1978).
126 Id at 597.
127 Id at 604.
128 Id at 597.
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So what was the broker to do? Most obviously, he could have
given her what she wanted, based on his assessment that she
was a competent adult capable of making her own decisions
about her wellbeing. This course of action would position the
broker as something between an advisor and an order taker-
giving guidance within narrow parameters set by the customer.
The broker could have instead substituted his own
judgment for the investor's and refused to recommend a risky
investment to her. Of course, this type of paternalism may be
ineffective in terms of causing the customer to reduce her risk
taking, but it would likely be quite effective at losing her as a
customer. She could find another broker willing to risk the
possibility of an unsuitability finding. That a customer might do
this is a good argument in favor of a suitability rule of broad
applicability. The original broker might be more likely to make a
suitable recommendation knowing that the probability of the
customer leaving was lower than it otherwise would be because
of the increased cost on other brokers from making unsuitable
recommendations. One problem with this explanation is that
there will be brokers who value an unsuitability finding less
than other brokers. For example, a high-quality broker would
consider a ban from the industry a much worse outcome than a
low-quality broker. Therefore the rule may do nothing more
than channel the most vulnerable investors to the lowest-quality
brokers. Even if the rule worked well and all brokers decided not
to recommend a risky investment to her, the customer could
always seek risk in other ways, perhaps by using the divorce
settlement to gamble or open a small business.
Finally, the broker could have taken steps, such as
disclosure or even persuasion, to convince her of the stupidity of
her choice, but then, ultimately, done as she asked. This would
be akin to the informed-consent model in health care. Doctors
can recommend dangerous procedures, but only if they have the
patient's consent based on fully and clearly disclosed
information about the risks.129 Doctors, like brokers, fill in an
important intermediary role, given their advantage of
information and expertise, and such a rule would harness this
advantage without foreclosing choice on the part of the
customer. Under this potential course of conduct, patients or
12 See, for example, R. Faden and T.L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of
Informed Consent (1986).
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investor-customers are viewed as the ones who should
ultimately be making decisions that affect themselves.
In Clark, however, the court held that the neither the
follow-instructions nor informed-consent approaches were legal.
The court's position was that the only legal-that is,
nonfraudulent-action would be to refuse to invest as the
customer wanted. 130 Clark thus implies that brokers have an
independent duty to prevent customers from making unsuitable
investments. This means that risky investments that could be
considered unsuitable bring with them an insurance against
loss13 and that brokers who are adjudged to have made
unsuitable recommendations may lose their livelihoods.
This is a duty far beyond that which normally passes for
acceptable conduct in brokered arrangements in other contexts.
Outside of the securities context, courts do not routinely upset
contracts entered into between consenting adults unless, for
example, there is an allegation that a weaker party to the
contract suffered from an informational disadvantage. And yet
the Clark court held that the broker committed fraud by not
convincing the customer not to take the risk she wanted to take
and not refusing to fill her request. Perhaps the best we can say
about Clark is that there will be examples of investments-like
an older widow on a relatively low fixed income investing in
risky bonds-that are so irrational that they cannot be the
product of an informed and careful decision, but rather must be
explained by broker opportunism. In other words, despite some
evidence that the customer drove this investment choice, it is
more likely that the broker's interests drove it.
Although suitability cases sometimes result in findings of
fraud, they more commonly result in FINRA administrative
sanctions. Take, for example, the recent case of Epstein v
SEC. 132 The defendant-broker worked for Merrill Lynch, making
mutual fund recommendations to Merrill's customers.1 33 He was
compensated largely on commissions, which he earned when
customers changed their fund allocations or moved from one
130 Clark, 583 F2d at 601.
131 If an investment drops in value and is later held to have been unsuitable, the
customer can recover the investment losses from the broker.
132 416 Fed Appx 142 (3d Cir 2010).
... Id at 144.
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fund to another. 134 The majority of the broker's customers
"ranged in age from 71 to 93 years old and were widowed,
retired, and earned low annual incomes," yet he recommended
that they incur relatively large transaction fees (meaning that
he received commissions) by switching mutual funds, often into
funds with higher fees.' 35 A FINRA hearing panel found the
broker committed securities fraud and violated FINRA's
suitability and professional conduct rules. 136 The National
Adjudicatory Council (NAC)-FINRA's highest adjudicative
body, which is comprised of fourteen members: seven
nonindustry members, two large firm members, two medium
firm members, two small firm members, and one at-large
member-threw out the securities fraud, but barred the broker
from the industry for making unsuitable investment
recommendations.137 FINRA, acting through the NAC, engaged
in private policing of ethics.
It is worth pausing for a minute to consider why the
suitability doctrine is needed at all. After all, brokers do not
generally have strong incentives to cheat their customers. No
broker that consistently cheats its customers stays in business
for long. Consider the Epstein case again. Although the broker in
question was just a twenty-three-year-old recent college
graduate, he was employed by Merrill Lynch, one of the oldest
and most well respected securities firms in the world. Certainly
Merrill Lynch valued its reputation in general, and with the
specific investors in particular, and therefore had strong
incentives to design its training, compensation, and supervision
systems to avoid this type of situation.
But reputation may not work perfectly, even for large, well-
established brokerages, not to mention smaller, less prominent
ones. Insolvency is one reason. A broker who plans to leave the
business after cheating customers is one who does not care
about its reputation. Economists call this the "final period"
problem; whatever work nonlegal sanctions are doing in
preventing misconduct is reduced in the last period before a
broker or firm leaves the industry. 138 Cheating, of which making
13 Id.
'n Id at 145.
1as Epstein, 416 Fed Appx at 145-46.
137 Id at 146.
13 See M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of
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an unsuitable recommendation to earn a commission might be
an example, is likely to be greater in final periods. Of course,
firms like Merrill Lynch survive longer, so they can be expected
to manage employees in a way that reduces each employee's
individual final period problem. 139 But inevitable agency costs
within large firms mean these mechanisms will be imperfect.
The broker in Epstein may not-likely did not-value Merrill
Lynch's reputation as much as the firm as a whole did and
therefore may privilege the value of short-term commission
payments at the expense of the firm. Brokerages have incentives
to police their agents, but this policing may be imperfect in the
presence of monitoring and other transaction costs. 140
This problem may exist at the firm level as well. The lack of
firm-level incentives to take care and make suitable
recommendations may be more acute for smaller brokerage
firms. Take the extreme case of a firm with a single registered
broker. The firm could start with low prices, cheat customers,
and then go out of business, leaving losses to fall on innocent
investors and society. This extreme case is probably fairly rare
given the burden of qualification and the fact that such a firm is
unlikely to attract many customers-or much money-in the
first instance. But there are many documented cases of smaller
firms acting unethically, specifically making unsuitable
recommendations, such as in the penny stock business. 141 And it
is common practice for brokers who engage in marginal conduct
to switch brokerage firms with some frequency.
Moreover, even if the extreme cases are rare, the problem
exists on a sliding scale, with firm size serving as a proxy for
this type of potential problem. The smaller the firm, the smaller
the firm's reputational capital and the smaller the incentive not
to cheat. If this is right, then the problem could be large. FINRA
has about 5,000 member firms, the overwhelming percentage of
which are small firms with a few registered brokers.
Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 Georgetown L J 1835, 1840
(2005).
139 See id at 1859.
140 See id at 1883.
14' For an example of small firm misbehavior involving penny stocks, see, for
example, FINRA News Release, FINRA Fines Five Firms $385,000 for Sale of
Unregistered Securities, Other Violations Relating to Penny Stocks (Apr 27, 2010), online
at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2010/Pl21331 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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Final period problems that result from limited liability or
within-firm agency costs may justify a prophylactic rule against
offering unsuitable recommendations, such as the one currently
found in FINRA Rule 2111. The rule is something that both
investors and (good) firms would prefer to offer but it might not
arise in a market of individual contracting. For investors, the
costs of individually negotiating such a contract may be too high.
Investors may not appreciate the issue in advance, may not
want to take the time to write a contract to cover suitability
concerns, or may fail to bargain for it for other reasons, such as
systematic optimism bias. Firms too might prefer to agree to be
bound by contract, but such a promise would be worthless
without the agreement by all firms to be bound by a rule
enforceable by a third party (for example, FINRA). This is where
law can be a valuable tool, providing a mandatory rule that
merely reflects what the parties would have agreed to, if given
the choice and the circumstances of perfect information and
perfect enforcement. In short, such a rule may be efficient and
social welfare maximizing but not something that would arise
without collective action.
As with other legal rules, the ideal suitability rule is one
that mimics what the parties would agree to in the absence of
such a rule.142 This should be considered from the perspective of
both investors and brokers as contracting parties. For each of
these relationships-investor-and-broker and broker-and-
broker-the optimal legal rule is one that mimics what a private
contract would in ideal circumstances. If free to contract about
how they would like to be treated, investors might desire
brokers to commit to make only suitable recommendations. This
is a costly request, however, since faced with the prospect of
liability for investments that turn out badly, brokers can be
expected to charge investors for this commitment. If litigation
were perfect and costless, then brokers would only be charging
for the value of the service provided, but neither of these
assumptions is realistic. In addition, some investors might not
want to pay even a fair price for the commitment, preferring to
142 For the operation of this principle in the context of contracs law, see Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, General Theories, in Boudewijin Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest,
eds, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol 3: The Regulation of Commerce, 1, 3-4
(Edward Elgar 2000). See also Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in
Peter Newman, ed, Vol 1: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 585,
585-88 (Macmillan Reference Ltd 1998).
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take the risk of unsuitable investment. Sophisticated investors
might fall into this category, which leads to another reason to
support a one-size-fits-all suitability rule. Requiring
sophisticated investors to pay for a suitability commitment that
they value at less than cost is simply a subsidy from
sophisticated to unsophisticated investors. If unsophisticated
investors are less wealthy-meaning they are less able to pay
the extra price for suitability protection but value it more highly
than sophisticated investors-then this cross-subsidy might
make sense. It would be a way of trying to level the playing field
to make securities markets more accessible to all investors.
Brokers too might agree to be bound by a suitability
promise in the absence of a rule requiring it. FINRA, acting as a
rough proxy for its industry members, could be seen as
expressing just this preference with its suitability rule. Being
bound by such a commitment is a way of signaling the quality of
the recommendations brokers make. This might be hard to do
absent a neutral third party, such as the government or FINRA,
acting as a credible enforcer of the promise.
A suitability rule may also serve as an efficient way for
firms to reduce agency costs. The shareholders or managers of a
firm may prefer that brokers only offer suitable investments as
a way of increasing the firm's reputation and therefore profits.
But shareholders and their agents may be unable to write
perfect contracts or perfectly monitor brokers to ensure this.
Externally enforced suitability rules may provide a valuable tool
for shareholders, brokers, and customers. Governmental or
quasi-governmental entities can provide penalties, like bans
from the industry, that private entities cannot. Such penalties
further deter offering unsuitable investments. In addition, it
may be cheaper for third parties like FINRA to monitor this
internal compliance. For one, there may be economies of scale in
enforcement. FINRA's computers, which monitor trades of all
registered brokers, may be better able to detect (albeit after the
fact) unsuitable investments or to do so at lower cost than the
same systems deployed at the firm level.
Managers may also be reluctant to discipline employees
with whom they work closely on a daily basis, either because of
personal bias or because of the perceived negative impact it may
have on the psychological wellbeing of other employees. A
culture of internal discipline can be highly negative and the
possibility that intermediate-level, or even high-level bosses,
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would look the other way or tacitly encourage misconduct is a
real risk. Third party enforcement reduces these problems, as
well as provides managers with an excuse for restrictions or
discipline. In the absence of a rule from the outside, a manager
may be reluctant to monitor or discipline a broker engaging in
questionable conduct; with an outside obligation, the manager
can play the good cop to the FINRA bad cop, telling his
employees that he is required to enforce the rule, not choosing to
do so as a personal matter.
With this basic understanding of the doctrine of suitability
laid out above, the next Part briefly considers applying this
approach to the mortgage industry.
D. Application to the Mortgage Industry
As noted above, suitability concerns were a significant
problem in the run-up to the collapse of the housing bubble and
led to significant negative consequences in its wake. News
reports are replete with stories of individual borrowers who took
out mortgages that were too risky for their personal
circumstances and deliberately more expensive and risky than
necessary. Crucially, not all unsuitable mortgages amounted to
downright fraud: some were more like mistakes, bets gone bad,
or products of informational asymmetries, which will not
support findings of intent necessary for fraud. Taking advantage
is not always illegal, but it can cause serious customer losses,
especially when the stakes are large.
The bluntness of the current approach could cut both ways.
Most obviously, applying only fraud law to unsuitable mortgage
investments may leave a significant number of socially
undesirable activities unpunished. On the other hand, courts
and juries may apply fraud law too liberally in some cases due to
sympathy for individuals who have lost their savings or homes
or due to ex post bias that leads to an erroneous finding of
intent. The first problem results in underdeterrence of socially
suboptimal behavior; the second problem results in
overdeterrence.
Mortgage reformers recognize these problems and try to
reduce them by banning many practices outright, interposing a
new federal agency between brokers and their customers, and
mandating more information disclosure to and counseling of
clients. However, a significant amount of academic work has
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refuted disclosure as a remedy.143 And the imposition of a
fiduciary duty-even if broadly construed-has two problems in
terms of its corrective ability. First, it is still a governmental
approach, which raises the administrability, expertise, and
efficiency concerns discussed above. Second, a fiduciary duty
solution is likely overbroad, since it would prevent lots of
behavior that is perfectly efficient for brokers vis-A-vis their
customers and would therefore reduce brokers' services and
raise the cost of a mortgage. For example, although securities
brokers do not (currently) have a fiduciary duty to their
customers, the suitability doctrine is still successfully deployed
to police unscrupulous brokers.
However effective the federal approach to mortgage
industry regulation is likely to be, there are aspects of such
regulation that would be better administered by the industry
itself, subject, of course, to oversight by the government to
protect against the cartelization threat. For instance, all of the
new activities required by the Mortgage Act and SAFE Act are
already done for brokers by FINRA. FINRA operates an efficient
and highly successful broker licensing and registration system,
conducts audits widely regarded as competent, conducts
investigations and prosecutions, and administers an enormous
arbitration system, all of which have adapted to changes in the
marketplace and been fairly well reviewed. For instance, in
2011, FINRA had nearly 3,000 employees providing direct
oversight of securities brokers. In that year, FINRA examined
and audited nearly 800 brokerages; it brought 1,488 disciplinary
actions against brokers, barring 329 individuals and suspending
475 others; and it engaged in widespread public education about
securities investing, including through over 100 grant-supported
projects. 144
In the simplest model, Congress could pass an analog to the
Maloney Act of 1938, in which prospective regulators, such as
the Mortgage Bankers Association, FINRA, and other entities,
would be invited to apply for certification as a mortgage SRO.
Congress is already considering this approach for the regulation
143 See, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U Pa L Rev 647 (2011).
144 FINRA, 2011 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report at 4 (cited in note
114).
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of investment advisors, an analogous situation.145 FINRA, as an
example, has experience running an SRO and it has experienced
staff and institutions familiar with examining brokers, bringing
disciplinary actions, and writing rules that are designed to
reduce losses in financial brokerage contracts.
But the SRO need not be FINRA or another existing broker.
Being an SRO can be a profitable business. In two of the past
three years, FINRA earned tens of millions in profits from its
regulatory operations. 146 The start-up costs for an SRO are likely
quite large-a report by the Boston Consulting Group estimates
the startup costs for a self-regulator for investment advisors
would be about $300 millionl 47-but this could be justified for a
business that generates $50 to $100 million in net income per
year. 148 Moreover, Congress could underwrite some of the initial
start-up costs, if necessary to create a vibrant SRO. This is not
an extraordinary amount relative to the alternatives. The CFPB
budget for 2013 is nearly $500 million. 149 Since about 40 percent
of its work involves mortgages, this amounts to a crude estimate
of about $200 million spent per year on mortgage regulation.150
This figure does not include the hundreds of millions spent
elsewhere in the federal and state regulatory apparatus on
mortgage regulation, whether it is through bank regulators
(remember, brokers working at banks are subject to the
regulatory authority of bank regulators) or the DOJ or state
bank and mortgage regulators.
IV. CONCLUSION
The subprime mortgage market was prone to obvious abuse
and excesses during the recent housing bubble, and this
145 See note 102 and accompanying text.
146 FINRA, 2011 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report at 5 (cited in note
114).
147 Boston Consulting Group, Investment Adviser Oversight: Economic Analysis of
Options, 5 (Boston Consulting Group Dec 2011), online at http://www.aicpa.org/
interestareas/personalfinancialplanning/newsandpublications/insideinformation/downlo
adabledocuments/bcgO/o2ia%20oversight%20economic%20analysis final_15dec201l.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
14s FINRA, 2011 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report at 36 (cited in note
114).
49 See CFPB, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Fiscal
Year 2012 at 49 (cited in note 76).
" See id at 20.
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undoubtedly contributed to the Great Financial Crisis.
Thousands of Americans, many who were particularly
vulnerable to financial predators, took out loans that were ill
suited to their financial condition. And, since a home is a vital
component of human flourishing, as well as the biggest
investment almost everyone will ever make, this resulted in
enormous social losses.
As described in this Article, the regulatory response has
been to create a new federal agency, to ban many practices, to
create a national licensing system, to impose a fiduciary duty
obligation on brokers, and to require "counseling" to reduce
mortgagor mistakes or bad judgment. This federal, law-based
approach has completely dried up the subprime market, and
imposed large regulatory costs on mortgage brokers. The federal
response is blunt, relying as it does on federal agents to police
mortgage transactions with bans or fraud as their primary tools.
This Article argues that there may be a better way of
reforming the mortgage practices and efficiently differentiating
between "good" and "bad" brokerage practices. Problems similar
to those that exist in mortgage investments also plague
securities investments, and brokered relationships in the
securities context are regulated primarily by the industry itself.
This model has been used for over two centuries, and it is has
proved quite adept at bringing industry expertise to bear, at
keeping regulatory costs low, and at trying to strike the optimal
balance between the freedom of individuals to make investments
and the paternalism necessary to ensure fraudsters do not take
undue advantage of the vulnerable.
While self-regulation is not a panacea and may be
ineffective, and in fact counterproductive, if not implemented
wisely, this is true of all regulation. The central point of this
Article is that there are significant efficiency gains, both in the
delivery of goods and services and in the regulation thereof, from
an effective deployment of self-regulation. It is not too late for
Congress or the CFPB and other bank regulators to learn this
lesson.
